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Abstract 
Environmental policy should explicitly address the appearance of the landscape because people make infer- 
ences about ecological quality from the look of the land. Where appearances are misleading, failing to portray 
ecological degradation or ecological health, public opinion may be ill-informed, with consequences for 
environmental policy. This paper argues that while ecology is a scientific concept, landscape perception is 
a social process. If we do not recognize this difference, we have problems with the appearance of ecological 
systems. Three influential problems are discussed: 1) the problem of the false identity of ecological systems, 
2) the problem of design and planning as deceit about ecological systems, and 3) the problem of invisible eco- 
logical systems. These problems for environmental policy may be resolved in part if landscape planners and 
policy-makers use socially-recognized signs to display human intentions for ecological systems. Specifically, 
planning and policy can include socially-recognized signs of beauty and stewardship to display human care 
for ecological systems. An example in United States federal agricultural policy is described. 
Environmental policy should explicitly address the 
look of the land, not because aesthetic quality is 
coequal with biotic and physical quality of the land- 
scape, though some have made this argument, but 
because the look of the land communicates. Kevin 
Lynch (1971) called the environment ‘an enormous 
communications device’. What people see, and par- 
ticularly our affective response to landscape, in- 
fluences what we think belongs in the landscape. 
Policy can intentionally use this enormous commu- 
nications device to suggest that patterns that sup- 
port the ecological function of the landscape belong 
there, or policy can fail to address human interpre- 
tation of ecological patterns. Both the broadened 
concept of ecology that landscape ecology repre- 
sents and the realities of the politics behind policy 
suggest that to ignore what the landscape communi- 
cates is naive. This paper explores the social dimen- 
sion of our perception of landscapes and suggests 
how that social dimension could inform environ- 
mental policy. 
The social dimension of perception 
The way things look is not always the way things 
are. This fact should be cause for consternation 
among those who are interested in the management 
of ecological systems. A highly functional land- 
scape structure may go unnoticed - even by people 
who depend upon its function. People may change 
the landscape, destroy its ecological function, 
without even knowing what they have done. If we 
assume that people want to live in healthy ecologi- 
cal systems, the problem is that the way the land- 
scape looks might not tell us whether the landscape 
is healthy or not. If we can see that the landscape 
is not healthy, we might do something about it. We 
might manage the landscape to improve its health. 
But we are unlikely to do that if we can’t see it. 
Why would we perceive a landscape as healthy 
when it is not? Or conversely, why would we per- 
ceive a landscape as unhealthy when it is not? One 
problem could be that we have a mistaken notion of 
what landscape health looks like; we have given 
ecological systems a false identity. Another 
problem could be that we are being deceived; we 
know what healthy ecological systems look like, but 
their true appearance is being masked by a mislead- 
ing facade. Finally, ecological systems may be in- 
visible; they exhibit no particular appearance for us 
to see. 
Why should we have any of these problems with 
the appearance of ecological systems? Usually the 
way things look is the way things are. What we see 
is usually self-evident and it is interpreted with a 
shared social understanding. We might have 
problems with the appearance of ecological systems 
because their appearance is inconsistent with our 
shared social understanding of the way landscapes 
are supposed to look; healthy ecosystems might not 
match our social understanding of the desirable ap- 
pearance of landscape. If we accept the fundamen- 
tally social nature of perception, we can learn some- 
thing about the way we see ecological systems and 
about how we might manage the appearance of eco- 
logical systems. 
The problem of the false identity of ecological 
systems 
We identify nature with beauty, and of course, we 
identify ecological systems with nature. Conse- 
quently, we assume that healthy ecological systems 
are beautiful. But this syllogism misleads. Natural- 
ness is a concept that has no specific appearance in 
form; it is a cultural concept determined by social 
process (Nash 1967; Nassauer 1979). When we 
identify ecology with nature, we fail to recognize 
the social dimension of our perception of nature as 
pristine beauty. Though we might see it that way, 
not everything that looks natural is pristine; it may 
not even be ecologically healthy. Furthermore, 
landscapes that are ecologically healthy may not 
look natural, at least not in the beautiful way that 
our social interpretation of nature demands. Nor 
are all healthy ecosystems pristine in the sense of 
being untouched by human action. 
However, our identification of ecology with our 
social conception of nature leads us to expect 
healthy ecological systems to be beautiful. Some 
are, and luckily so, for the beauty of nature as artic- 
ulated by Frederick Law Olmsted was a primary ra- 
tionale for establishing the national park system 
(Nash 1967; Laurie 1979); in this case, beauty 
served ecology. But if we generalize from such 
prominent examples as the national parks to the 
landscape as a whole, we confuse our perceptions 
of natural beauty with ecological function. 
Our identification of ecology with a particular in- 
terpretation of natural beauty, that is pristine na- 
ture, obscures the possibility that healthy ecological 
systems can display natural beauty without being 
pristine. When he proclaimed The End of Nature 
(1989), Bill McKibben failed to see this possibility. 
McKibben repeatedly points to threatened changes 
in human perception of nature to support his 
philosophical stance against human intervention 
in nature. Though much of his book surveys evi- 
dence and opinion about the inevitable biological 
and physical consequences of global warming, 
McKibben seems most profoundly affected by the 
way in which global warming and biotechnology 
have changed his perception of nature. The end of 
nature as he discusses it is not the end of ecological 
function, it is the end of a particular perception of 
natural beauty that depends upon the illusion that 
nature is distinct from humanity. 
‘ . . . The death of (nature) begins with concrete 
changes in the reality around us - changes that 
scientists can measure and enumerate. More and 
more frequently, these changes will clash with our 
perceptions, until, finally, our sense of nature as 
eternal and separate is washed away, and we will see 
all too clearly what we have done’ (p. 8, McKibben 
1989). 
McKibben abhors the ‘domestication’ of the 
earth because ‘there’s no such thing as nature any- 
more - that other world that isn’t business and art 
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and breakfast is now not another world, and there 
is nothing except us alone’ (p. 89). He tells how 
William Bartram, an eighteenth century naturalist, 
explored the southeastern region of the United 
States and ‘found vigorous beauty’ in ‘whatever 
direction he struck off in’, how George Catlin’s 
journal descriptions of the picturesque beauty of 
the frontier West form a baseline in his mind, ‘a 
reminder of where we began’. McKibben’s objec- 
tion to ‘rational management’ of the wild is that it 
produces something that ‘looks a lot like nature but 
isn’t’ (p. 168). 
What makes the current crisis so intransigent to 
‘personal solutions’ and finally sounds the death 
knell for nature says McKibben is that ‘the green- 
house effect is the first environmental problem we 
can’t escape by moving to the woods’ (p. 204). 
McKibben’s juxtaposition of the ideas of solution 
and escape are problematic. First, what does he 
mean by a personal solution? Certainly escaping to 
the woods doesn’t solve any environmental prob- 
lem. It only changes the perceptual evidence of the 
problem: out of sight, out of mind. Second, where 
is he escaping to? Did the woods ever provide a 
‘sense of nature as eternal and separate’ from 
humanity? Only if one were oblivious to the shared 
social perception necessary for the woods to exist 
could one escape environmental problems by 
moving to the woods. In fact, McKibben’s woods, 
the New York State Adirondack Park that he so 
lovingly describes, is a social pact, an agreement to 
manage a landscape in a particular way. The time 
for escape, if there ever was one, has long since 
passed. 
McKibben’s example of the woods that he ad- 
mires as nature is a social construction. And his 
deep affection for the nature he sees in the woods 
suggests that this particular social construction is 
not a bad thing. What he was perceived there has 
contributed to his move to do something about eco- 
logical quality, to write a book called The End of 
Nature. The problem is that he does not incor- 
porate the social basis for the woods into his argu- 
ment for nature. Rather, he concludes that ‘the 
comfort we need is inhuman’. He has given the na- 
ture he perceives a false identity. 
Some who identify nature as separate from 
humanity may conclude with McKibben that eco- 
logical systems are best left unsullied by human ac- 
tion. Others who identify nature as separate may 
see this separation as license for unbridled use of 
ecosystems. Their view may lead them to intervene 
without respect for ecological function, making for 
human purposes different from McKibben’s. While 
the sound of a chain saw buzzing in the Adirondack 
woods intrudes upon McKibben’s feeling that he is 
in ‘another, separate, timeless, wild sphere’ (p. 47)’ 
the person using the chain saw may very well share 
McKibben’s sense of the woods as separate from 
humanity - only ‘humanity’ is where the person 
cutting timber lives. Whatever destruction may be 
perpetrated there will be left behind when the tim- 
ber is hauled out of the woods. Once again, out of 
sight, out of mind. McKibben may wish to escape 
to the woods, but this person will escape from the 
woods, objecting to ecological degradation only if 
it appears in his or her own backyard. 
The chain saw operator and McKibben in the 
‘separate, timeless, wild sphere’ represent equally 
logical but philosophicaly opposed implications of 
the problem of the false identity of ecological sys- 
tems. It follows that once separate from nature, we 
human beings may choose either to degrade or deify 
what we see as distinct from ourselves. 
The problem of design and planning as deceit about 
ecological systems 
If we walked through the woods with McKibben to 
where the chain saw was buzzing and saw the timber 
harvest site, would it be beautiful? Would it look 
natural? Probably not. If we share McKibben’s 
sense of nature in the woods, we might be happier 
if we hadn’t taken the walk at all. We might be hap- 
pier still if the chain saw were equipped with a com- 
pletely effective muffler. The effect would be the 
protection of our illusions. Protection of illusions 
can be called deceit. 
Perhaps in his perception of the woods, McKib- 
ben is only one of the ‘gullible public’ (in the words 
of Denis Wood, 1988)’ a victim of some design or 
planning expert’s intention to deceive the viewer 
about the real human purpose or history of the 
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woods by masking what is really there. Wood 
delivers a highly-charged critique of the federal 
government land-managing agencies’ visual man- 
agement systems (USDA 1973-85, USDI 1975, 
USDT 1976-79) as tools for severing ecological 
reality from landscape appearance. He points to the 
visual management systems’ aim to conceal the log- 
ging, grazing, mining, and resort development that 
occur on federal lands by designing such activities 
so that they ‘blend’ with their natural surround- 
ings. Such dissembling with form he terms a lie. 
‘The point is not the resource use, but the lying 
about it, not the cutting down of trees, but the at- 
tempt to pretend we didn’t do it (it was the wind, 
it was the rockslides, it was the fire).’ Rather he sug- 
gests that design and management should tell the 
truth. Doing so ‘will force us to accept responsibili- 
ty for our desires’ (p. 203, Wood 1988). 
Though the New York State Adirondack Park 
would not have been managed with federal visual 
management systems, it was established and has 
been managed with the same picturesque conven- 
tions that they only make explicit (Nash 1967; 
Adirondack Park Agency 1979; The Commission 
on the Adirondacks 1990). Since the Industrial 
Revolution, the dominant Western landscape de- 
sign convention has been the picturesque, an ideal 
articulated in the 17th century by Alexander Pope 
as the beauty of ‘nature methodized’ (Pevsner 
1944). The idea has been so powerful that it has 
evolved and been integrated into cultural norms for 
landscape appearance, not as an idea about nature 
but as a ‘frozen’ icon, unreflectively perpetuated 
(Howett 1987). Sidney Robinson explains that ‘we 
owe to the 19th century the confusion that a case of 
mistaken identity perpetrated by a picturesque 
landscape is the same as being natural,’ where he 
means ‘natural’ as being ‘privileg[ed] . . . as na- 
ture’s way’ (p. 9, 1990). In fact, Humphrey Rep- 
ton’s description of the four key principles of his art 
in his ‘Enquiry into the Changes of Taste in Land- 
scape Gardening’ (1806) spells out the means of 
confusion: ‘First, it must display the natural beau- 
ties and hide the natural defects of every situation; 
secondly, it should give the appearance of extent 
and freedom, by carefully disguising or hiding the 
boundary; thirdly, it must studiously conceal every 
interference of art, however expensive, by which 
the scenery is improved; making the whole appear 
the production of nature only; and fourthly, all ob- 
jects of mere convenience or comfort, if incapable 
of being made ornamental, or of becoming proper 
parts of the general scenery, must be removed or 
cancelled . . . ’ (Clifford 1963). 
The picturesque image of nature has become part 
of western culture to such a degree that it is fre- 
quently mistaken for nature, making the ‘method’ 
of the plan or design invisible but the effect of the 
design expected. Robinson warns that ‘appeals to 
the circumstantial appearance of nature as the 
justification for a landscape aesthetic are rhetorical 
gestures, not the guarantee of truth’ (p. 9, 1990). 
We should not expect the 20th century picturesque 
we have received to be about truth but about rhetor- 
ic, and shared social meaning. In fact, the visual 
management systems that Wood so sharply criti- 
cizes are clear in their statement that they are in- 
tended to produce an ‘expected image’, particularly 
for tourists, not to reveal ecological reality, which 
may contradict social expectations (McGuire 1979). 
The visual management systems are a form of 
rhetoric. They are grounded in a social concept, 
that which constitutes an aesthetically pleasing 
environment. 
When the United States National Environmental 
Policy Act (1969) dictated that federal actions 
would ‘assure for all Americans . . . aesthetically 
and culturally pleasing surroundings’, federal agen- 
cies made the picturesque image explicit. These ex- 
plicit statements and the burgeoning ecological 
awareness of the time startled landscape scholars 
into reflecting upon our assumptions. The systems 
spelled out the desirability of hiding landscape 
functions that might be perceived as unattractive 
behind a hill, out of the viewshed. They clarified 
our social expectation of nature, where what clearly 
isn’t nature (a building or a logging pattern) has at 
least been made to look like it. 
At the same time as the visual management sys- 
tems were being implemented, toxic chemicals were 
being dug from school grounds in New York and 
animal species were becoming endangered in na- 
tional forests managed for aesthetic quality. As 








vation Reserve Program (CRP). They have been 
returned to nature in the sense that they have been 
planted with perennial cover to serve as habitat and 
to reduce soil erosion. Yet the approximately 22 bil- 
lion dollars (GAO 1989) that will be spent on this 
program have produced ecological quality that is 
unrecognizable to most citizens. Many people find 
CRP parcels ugly because they perceive their uncul- 
tivated cover as weedy or neglected. Federal policy 
makers were oblivious to the opportunity for using 
these 34 million acres as ‘an enormous communica- 
tions device’. They did not attempt to hide the CRP 
(no picturesque problems here). They simply re- 
vealed it without any consideration for the vernacu- 
lar language of landscape aesthetics which the 
farmer participants in the CRP program and the 
public employ when they drive through the rural 
landscape. A better approach would have been to 
design CRP parcels to portray their ecological 
benefits. Vernacular characteristics of landscape 
beauty could have been used to label the good 
stewardship that CRP lands embody. 
The accompanying computer-based landscape 
simulations of a southeastern Minnesota agricul- 
tural landscape (Pitt and Nassauer 1989; Pitt 1990) 
demonstrate how vernacular aesthetics might be 
used to portray the ecological quality of agricultur- 
al landscapes where soil and water conservation 
and habitat enhancement practices are imple- 
mented (Figs. 1-6). They are presented here to 
illustrate the range of possible appearances of eco- 
logical systems and to suggest the potential for 
aesthetic language to help us see ecological value. 
Conclusions 
If we can manage the appearance of landscape to 
show that ecological functions are intended by hu- 
man action, we defend them against other kinds of 
ecologically misdirected, even if well intended, hu- 
man ‘improvements’. If we design and maintain 
landscapes, from wilderness preserves to small en- 
vironmental resource patches, to show that they are 
not leftover or simply undeveloped, and that sorne- 
one stands behind their existence, we force them to 
become the topic of social discourse. An affront to 
the landscape then becomes an affront to its 
caretaker. 
Landscape structure and ecological function rest 
upon an armature of shared social perceptions of 
the meaning and appropriate treatment of land- 
scape. Failure to address these perceptions as we 
plan, design, and manage the landscape will assure 
a clash between public perception of nature and 
public action on behalf of ecological function. 
Rather we can use our shared language of landscape 
perception to enable people to see and defend the 
ecological systems upon which they depend. 
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